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Abstract
This Letter describes how to determine the parameter of the chaotic Lorenz system
used in a two-channel cryptosystem. First the geometrical properties of the Lorenz
system are used to reduce the parameter search space. Second the parameters are
exactly determined - directly from the ciphertext - through the minimization of the
average jamming noise power created by the encryption process.
Key words: Secure communication, Cryptanalysis, Synchronization, Lorenz
chaotic system.
PACS: 05.45.Ac, 47.20.Ky.
1 Introduction
In recent years, a growing number of cryptosystems based on chaos synchro-
nization have been proposed [1], many of them fundamentally flawed by a lack
of robustness and security.
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The first cryptographic schemes based on chaos synchronization were based on
masking the plaintext message by a variable of the chaotic generator system [2–
4]. Sender and receiver must be synchronized in order to regenerate the chaotic
signal at the receiver and thus recover the message. However this simple design
is easily broken by elemental filtering of the ciphertext signal [5–7].
Recently, some work based on chaotic cryptosystems with an enhanced-
plaintext-concealing mechanism have appeared in the literature [8–12]. In some
of these cryptosystems the ciphertext consists of a complex non-linear combi-
nation of the plaintext and a variable of a chaotic transmitter’s generator, from
which retrieving a clean plaintext becomes an unattainable goal. As it was not
possible to synchronize a chaotic receiver with such ciphertext, a second chan-
nel had to be inserted in the system for this purpose. The synchronizing signal
was a different chaotic variable generated by the sender, which was transmit-
ted without any additional modification. The same values for the parameters
were used at sender and receiver [10–12].
One of the cryptosystems described above, proposed by Jiang [10], made use
of the Lorenz chaotic system [13], which is defined by the following equations:
x˙ = σ(y − x),
y˙ = ρx− y − xz, (1)
z˙ = xy − βz,
where σ, ρ and β are fixed parameters.
The ciphertext s was defined as
s = f1(x, y, z) + f2(x, y, z)m, (2)
where m is the plaintext.
The receiver was designed as a reduced-order non-linear observer with a mech-
anism to achieve efficient partial synchronization under the drive of x(t). It
can generate two signals yr(t) and zr(t) that converge to the driver system’s
variables y(t) and z(t), respectively, as t→∞.
The recovered plaintext m∗(t) was retrieved using the following function:
m∗ =
s
f2(x, yr, zr)
− f1(x, yr, zr)
f2(x, yr, zr)
. (3)
An example with the functions:
f1(x, y, z) = y
2,
f2(x, y, z) = 1 + y
2, (4)
and the following parameter values: σ = 10, ρ = 28 and β = 8/3;
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and the following initial conditions: (x(0), y(0), z(0)) = (0, 0.01, 0.01) and
(yr(0), zr(0)) = (0.05, 0.05) was given in [10, §III]. The plaintext was a small-
amplitude sinusoidal signal of 30 Hz, m(t) = 0.05 sin(2pi30t). The author
claims this cryptosystem guarantees higher security and privacy, showing that
an error of 0.05 in the retrieval of yr due to a poor parameter estimation, gives
rise to a serious distortion in the retrieved plaintext.
The vast majority of continuous chaotic cryptosystems are based on the syn-
chronization of drive and response subsystems [14,15], in this regard they are
similar to the conventional self-synchronizing stream ciphers [16,17]. Their se-
curity relies on the secrecy of the chaotic system’s parameters, or some other
complementary parameters that control how the plaintext is included or other
additional masking signals [8,18], which all together play the role of the se-
cret key [19]. Hence, finding these parameters is equivalent to breaking the
system. Due to the self-synchronizing mechanism of these systems the initial
conditions are not part of the key.
Recently, Solak [20] analyzed the cryptosystem described in [10] and showed
how an eavesdropper could identify the value of the parameter ρ, provided
that he has the previous knowledge of the remaining two parameters of the
transmitter’s system β and σ. Solak’s approach was based on a novel expres-
sion of the Lorenz system. Previously Stojanovski, Kocarev and Parlitz [21]
had described a generic method to reveal simultaneously all three parameters
of a Lorenz system when one of the variables x(t) or y(t) were known. Such
method could be applied to break this cryptosystem.
The present work describes an efficient method of determining the two only
unknown parameters ρ and β of [10] needed to build up an intruder Lorenz
system’s receiver, from the ciphertext alone, i.e. without partial knowledge
of any of the transmitter’s parameters. First, some geometrical properties of
the Lorenz attractor are shown. Then, these are used to minimize, as much as
possible, the parameters’ search space. Finally, the parameters of the unknown
receiver are determined with high accuracy.
2 The Lorenz attractor’s geometrical properties
According to [13], the Lorenz system has three equilibrium points. The origin
is an equilibrium point for all values of the parameters. For 0 < ρ < 1 the
origin is a globally attracting asymptotically stable sink. For 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρH the
origin becomes a non-stable saddle point, giving rise to two other stable twin
equilibrium points C+ and C−, of coordinates xC± = ±
√
β(ρ− 1), yC± =
±
√
β(ρ− 1) and zC± = ρ − 1, being ρH a critical value, corresponding to a
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Fig. 1. Lorenz chaotic attractor; (a) x − y plane projection; (b) enlarged view,
showing the incoming trajectories portion attracted by the equilibrium point C+.
The flow direction is indicated by arrows. The position of the equilibrium points
C+ and C− is indicated by asterisks.
Hopf bifurcation [22], of value:
ρH =
σ(σ + β + 3)
(σ − β − 1) . (5)
When ρ exceeds the critical value ρH the equilibrium points C
+ and C− be-
come non-stable saddle foci, by a Hopf bifurcation, and the strange Lorenz
attractor appears. The flow, linearized around C+ and C−, has one negative
real eigenvalue and a complex conjugate pair of eigenvalues with positive real
part. As a consequence, the equilibrium points are linearly attracting and
spirally repelling.
Figure 1(a) shows the double scroll Lorenz attractor formed by the projection
– on the x − y plane– in the phase space of a trajectory portion extending
along 12 s. The parameters are σ = 16, ρ = 100 and β = 8/3.
It is a well-known fact that the trajectory of the Lorenz attractor draws two
3D loops, in the vicinity of the equilibrium points C+ and C−. This trajectory
has the shape of a spiral of steadily growing amplitude, jumping from one
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Fig. 2. Relative error associated to the estimation of the equilibrium points C±,
when taking the eye center’s coordinate x∗
C±
instead of its true value xC± .
equilibrium point to the other, at irregular intervals, in a random – although
deterministic– manner [13]. The trajectory may pass arbitrarily near the equi-
librium points, but never reach them while in chaotic regime.
The geometrical properties of the Lorenz system allow for a previous re-
duction of the search space of the parameters ρ and β, taking advantage
of the relationship between them at the equilibrium points of coordinates
xC± = ±
√
β(ρ− 1).
Let us call the two neighborhood regions around the equilibrium points that
are not filled with the spiral trajectory the attractor eyes. The eyes’ centres
are the fixed points C+ and C−.
The pending problem is to determine the eyes’ centres when the inner turns
are missing, as it happens in normal chaotic regime. With the drive signal x(t),
we solved it experimentally by estimating the middle point value between the
trajectory of maxima and minima in the phase space projection on the x− y
plane. The most accurate result was obtained by taking into account only
the regular spiral cycle closest to the center, shown in Fig. 1(b) as a thick
continuous line. The x-coordinate of the eye center was calculated by using
the following empirical formula:
x∗C± =
0.9 xm1 + 0.1 xm2 + xM1
2
, (6)
where xM1 is the minimum value of all the maxima of the spiral trajectory
|x(t)| and xm1 and xm2 are the two minima immediately preceding and fol-
lowing xM1, respectively.
As the spiral has a growing radius, it was necessary to take a weighted mean
between the two minima xm1 and xm2, being the optimal values of the two
weights experimentally determined. Instead of making two computations, one
around C+ and another around C−, a unique computation was performed
on the absolute value of the waveform x(t), |x(t)|. It should be noted that
the maxima that take place after a change of sign of x(t) and y(t) must be
discarded as they belong to the incoming trajectory portion attracted by the
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equilibrium points C± and do not belong to the spiral trajectory. This is
illustrated in Fig. 1(b) as a thick dashed line.
Figure 2 illustrates the relative error (x∗C± − xC±)/xC± of the estimation of
xC± when taking the eye center’s coordinate x
∗
C± instead of its true value
xC± ; it can be seen that its magnitude is less than 2× 10−3. The parameters
of the system were varied in the margins: σ ∈ (9.7, 37.4), ρ ∈ (25.6, 94.8)
and β ∈ (2.6, 8.4). The initial conditions of the system were the same as
those described in [10, §III]; the period of the measurement was 20 s and the
sampling frequency was 1200 Hz 1 .
Therefore the search space of the unknown parameters β and ρ is reduced to a
narrow margin defined as β∗(ρ∗−1) ∈ {0.996 x∗ 2C± , 1.004 x∗ 2C±}. The parameter
σ is also unknown; but, as described in Sec. 3, its knowledge is not necessary
to assemble an intruder receiver capable of breaking the system.
Applying this method to the proposed example described in [10, §III], whose
equilibrium point is xC± =
√
72, the absolute error when determining x∗C± was
7.5× 10−4, which is equivalent to a relative error smaller than 0.01%.
3 Breaking of the proposed encryption system
We designed an intruder receiver system based on a homogeneous driving
synchronization mechanism [23] between the transmitter’s drive Lorenz system
and a receiver response subsystem. The receiver response subsystem was a
partial duplicate of the drive system reduced to only two variables yr(t) and
zr(t), driven by the drive variable x(t). The receiver response subsystem was
defined by the following equations:
y˙r = ρx− yr − xzr,
z˙r = xyr − βzr. (7)
Note that for breaking the system it is only necessary to attain the values of
the parameters ρ and β. This means that the parameter σ can be ignored and
need not to be determined, unlike in the Solak method [20] where its previous
knowledge is required, or in the Stojanovski et al. method [21], where the
simultaneous determination of all the three unknown parameters is required.
As it was shown in [14] and [23, §III], when the drive is x and the response
is (yr, zr), the two conditional Lyapunov exponents of the Lorenz system are
negative, thus leading to a very stable system with fast synchronization. The
1 All the results presented here were based on simulations using MATLAB , the
Lorenz integration algorithm was a four-fifth order Runge-Kutta with an absolute
error tolerance of 10−9 and a relative error tolerance of 10−6.
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Fig. 3. Logarithmic power spectrum of the retrieved plaintext with a wrong guessing
for the response system’s parameters.
consequence is that, if the parameters of drive and response systems are mod-
erately different, the drive and response variables will be alike, though not
totally identical. This property may be exploited to search the correct param-
eter values by looking at the retrieved plaintext and applying an optimization
procedure to find the parameters that provide the best retrieved-plaintext
quality.
When the synchronizing signal is fed to the response system described by
Eq. (7) and the parameters of both systems agree, i.e. ρ∗ = ρ and β∗ = β,
then variables y and yr of the drive an response systems are equal. In this
case the recovered text m∗(t) identically follows the plaintext m(t) and the
effect of different initial conditions after a very short transient is negligible. If
the parameters of both systems do not agree, the recovered text will consist
of a noisy distorted version of the original plaintext, growing the noise and
distortion as the mismatch between drive and response systems parameters
grows.
3.1 Determination of the systems’s parameters
In the particular case described in [10, §III], the encryption and decryption
functions were:
s= y2 + (1 + y2)m, (8)
m∗=
s
1 + y2r
− y
2
r
1 + y2r
. (9)
Equation (9) of the recovered text can be rewritten as:
m∗ = m
1 + y2
1 + y2r
+
y2 − y2r
1 + y2r
. (10)
The first term of this equation is a function of the plaintext message m(t) and
the variables y and yr. When y = yr this term is reduced to the undistorted
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plaintext, but if y 6= yr a noticeable distortion will appear. The second term
of Eq. (10) is a function of y and yr and can be considered as a jamming
noise. Figure 3 depicts the spectrum of the recovered text corresponding to
this example using a wrong guessing of the response system’s parameters of:
ρ∗ = 28.01 and β∗ = 2.667. It can be seen that the spectrum has two main
frequency bands: one around the plaintext m(t) frequency of 30Hz, which
corresponds to the distorted plaintext, and another near 0Hz that corresponds
to the jamming noise. Assuming the plaintext will always consist of an a.c.
band limited signal without d.c. component, as in the numerical example given
in [10], it is clear from Fig. 3 that the second term of Eq. (10) may be isolated
from the first one by means of a suitable filter.
The most important band of the jamming noise ε was isolated by means of a
finite-impulse-response low-pass filter with 2048 terms and a cutoff frequency
of 0.2Hz, which suppressed the contribution of the plaintext m(t) and most of
the frequency terms generated by the modulation with the chaotic signal y2(t).
Figure 4 illustrates the mean value of the squared noise ε2, i.e. the average noise
power, as a function of ρ∗, with the eye center x∗C± as parameter, with the same
parameters of the transmitter’s system of the numerical example presented in
[10] and the intruder receiver’s system described by Eq. (7). The mean of ε2
was computed along the first 20 s, after a delay of 2 seconds, to let the initial
transient finish. It is clearly seen that the noise grows monotonically with
the mismatch between the transmitter’s and receiver’s parameters |ρ∗ − ρ|. It
can also be noticed that the minimum error corresponds to the case where the
parameters of the receiver’s system ρ∗ exactly match those of the transmitter’s
ρ, when x∗C± = xC± =
√
β(ρ− 1) = √72.
The search for the correct values of the parameters β∗ and ρ∗ was carried out
using the following procedure:
8
(1) Determine the approximate value of the eye center x∗C± from the x(t)
waveform, as described in Section 2.
(2) Keep the previous value obtained for x∗C± and vary the value of ρ
∗ until
a minimum of the average noise power is reached.
(3) Keep the previous value of ρ∗and vary the value of eye center x∗C± until
a new minimum of the average noise power is reached.
(4) Repeat steps (2) and (3) until a stable result of the average noise power
is reached and retain the last values obtained for ρ∗ and x∗C± as the final
ones.
(5) Calculate the value of β∗ as β∗ = (x∗C±)
2/(ρ∗ − 1).
Table 1 shows the evolution of the relative eye center error, the relative ρ∗
parameter error and the average jamming noise power. It can be seen that
the procedure converges rapidly to the exact values of ρ∗ = ρ = 28 and
x∗C± = xC± =
√
72.
Table 1
Evolution of the relative eye center error, the relative ρ∗ parameter error and the
average jamming noise power.
Step Relative eye center error Relative ρ∗ error Average noise
(x∗
C±
− xC±)/xC± (ρ∗ − ρ)/ρ power ε2
1 8.90 × 10−5
2 8.90 × 10−5• −3.57 × 10−8 5.2× 10−8
3 2.72 × 10−8 −3.57 × 10−8• 8.9 × 10−12
4 2.72 × 10−8• 0 6.5 × 10−13
5 0 0• 6.1 × 10−13
6 0• 0 6.1 × 10−13
• = old data held from the previous step
The value of the unknown parameter β∗ was deduced using the estimated
values of ρ∗ and x∗C± from Eq. (6)and β
∗ =
(x∗
C±
)2
(ρ∗−1)
= 8
3
.
Note that this method also works for the general case described by Eqs. (2)
and (3). These equations have similar structure to Eqs. (8) and (9), which
describe the special case described in [10, §III], which was chosen here for
experimental demonstration.
3.2 Retrieving of the plaintext
As the system’s parameters are equivalent to the system’s key, once the exact
values of β∗ and ρ∗ are known, the ciphertext can be efficiently decrypted
by the intruder receiver system defined by Eq. (7). Figure 5 shows the three
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Fig. 5. Retrieved plaintext with the ultimate values of the response system param-
eters.
first seconds of the retrieved plaintext using the response system described by
Eq. (7), corresponding to the ciphertext used in [10, §III]. It can be seen that
the plaintext is perfectly recovered after a short transient period of less than
one second.
4 Simulations
All the results presented here were based on simulations using MATLAB ,
the Lorenz integration algorithm was a four-fifth order Runge-Kutta with an
absolute error tolerance of 10−9 and a relative error tolerance of 10−6.
5 Conclusions
A simple method was proposed to reduce the parameter search space of the
Lorenz system, based on the determination of the system’s equilibrium points
from the analysis of the waveform of one of its variables x(t). This method
was then applied to the cryptanalysis of the cryptosystem [10], showing that
this is rather weak since it can be broken without knowing the values of its
parameters. The total lack of security discourages the use of this algorithm for
secure applications. However the system security can be moderately improved
if the functions described by Eq. (2) and Eqs. (4) were made considerably
more complicated than those used in [10, §III] and dependent from several
unknown parameters, composing part of the key.
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